In my opinion, and based on facts in the public domain, the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu can at best be accused of incompetence, gross negligence for not paying sufficient attention to timely, ample, accurate, detailed intelligence data collected shared by allies like Egypt and from within various Israel agencies.
At worst, I’m questioning if he and his extreme right coalition partners who’ve been dreaming forever of relocating all Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza to another country or even their outright elimination, were willfully ignorant by consciously deciding to discount the myriad of intelligence information coming their way prior to the October 7, 2023 massacre by Hamas in Israeli territory on the Gazan border, where over 1,200 were brutally murdered and 240 were taken hostage.
I’ve already discussed how Egypt’s intelligence officials shared lots of intelligence regarding Hamas imminent plans to attack Israel and how the Israeli IDF military failed for several hours to respond to Israelis cries for help…
See: “Egypt warned Israel days before Hamas struck, US committee chairman says/ BBC
Israel Knew Hamas’s Attack Plan More Than a Year Ago /NYT
How Israel’s Security Services Failed to Stop Hamas – NYT
The following articles demonstrates how Israeli right-wing officials discounted ample intelligence collected within Israel…
As per the November 22, 2023 Haaretz editorial, “Netanyahu Knew. Netanyahu Ignored. Netanyahu Is Responsible
Excerpts:
“Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was given updates from the Israel Defense Forces’ Military Intelligence Directorate concerning the possibility of a Hamas attack. It is the same intelligence body that Netanyahu tweeted about on October 29 at 1:10 A.M., asserting that “under no circumstances and at no stage was Prime Minister Netanyahu warned about Hamas’ intending to go to war.”
“But Netanyahu chose to ignore this dire professional assessment, and soon afterward, he opted to make the situation even worse: Just days after getting the letter, the prime minister chose to dismiss Defense Minister Yoav Gallant after the latter also warned about exactly the same danger. Only because the public went out en masse to protest against this preposterous act, which was based on fundamentally flawed considerations, did Netanyahu decide to keep Gallant on the job.”
“Sa’ar didn’t stop with the one letter he sent to Netanyahu in March, but wrote a second one in July. It opened with a warning that “the worsening of the crisis has deepened the erosion of Israel’s image, has further undercut Israeli deterrence and increases the likelihood of escalation.” He stressed that from the enemy’s point of view, Israel was at “one of the weakest points since its establishment” and that significant things were being said “in closed and professional forums of security forces in Iran, Lebanon and the Gaza Strip.” This letter also made no impression on Netanyahu, who continued to insist on moving ahead with the judicial overhaul.”
“The response of the Prime Minister’s Office to these 2 letters captures the kind of manipulation and lies that characterize Netanyahu’s leadership of the state: “In contrast to what has been reported, Prime Minister Netanyahu never was given any warning of war.” To the contrary, the prime minister did get exacting warnings about what tragically became true a few months later.”
“Netanyahu is responsible and also to blame for what happened on that accursed Black Saturday. He failed in his most important duty, which is to ensure the security of Israelis. At the end of the war, he will have to face a state commission of inquiry and explain his failures.”
As per the November 24, 2023 Haaretz report by Amos Harel, Over a Year Before October 7, Israel’s Army Had Insight Into Hamas’ Plan to Attack Israeli towns, IDF Bases:
Excerpts:
“For over a year before Hamas’ massive attack on Israel last month, Military Intelligence had detailed information on the group’s plan to breach the Gaza border at dozens of points and attack dozens of communities and army posts, defense officials say.”
“Most of this information was shared with the Shin Bet security service, the officials said in the weeks since the war erupted, adding that the political leadership, which changed at the end of last year, was familiar with at least some of the intelligence. But Israel didn’t properly prepare for the threat and didn’t seem to believe that the Hamas leader in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar, intended to implement the plan.”
“The intelligence failure, combined with insufficient defense along the border fence and an errant policy on the Palestinians in general, triggered a total surprise – and massive civilian and military casualties.”
“Many of the shortcomings have already been reported by Haaretz and other Israeli journalists. These include warnings by the head of Military Intelligence’s research division, Brig. Gen. Amit Saar, about a “perfect storm” in the region that would exploit Israel’s domestic turmoil wrought by the Netanyahu government’s plan to weaken the judicial system.”
“There were also the warnings by the army’s women spotters on the Gaza border, and the nightly consultations in the army and Shin Bet that didn’t produce the right adjustments and enabled Hamas to kill around 1,200 Israelis and take around 240 hostages on October 7.”
“In the run-up to Hamas’ murders, kidnappings and abuse on October 7, the army did not receive any information on plans to carry out sexual assaults, of which evidence is increasing.”
“Officers in the Southern Command and higher admit that Israel’s defense plan wasn’t designed to combat thousands of armed terrorists, among them around 1,000 elite Nukhba fighters in the first wave. The Israelis were counting on a more focused effort, not a large force breaking through at 20 points.”
“Some of the difficulties stemmed from a decision at Unit 8200, the Israeli army’s equivalent of the U.S. National Security Agency, to reduce coverage of the enemy’s tactical communications. Israel apparently chose to rely on more advanced technology and mistakenly believed that it had a full picture of the enemy’s intentions and capabilities.”
“There was one righteous person in this story, an experienced, professional noncommissioned officer in Unit 8200 specializing in the enemy’s military doctrine. Her warnings jibe with the many warnings that the women spotters in the Gaza Division raised.”
“Over a period of months before the war, she wrote 3 documents warning her superiors about Hamas’ intentions. A few months ago, she reported that Hamas in Gaza had completed exercises simulating an invasion of kibbutzim and border-fence posts.”
“In July, she reported that the group had completed even more exercises. In one document she added a horrifying statement revealing Hamas’ intention to severely harm residents of the kibbutzim.”
“She concluded that Hamas had completed its preparations; part of her evidence was a visit by senior Hamas officials to watch the exercises – an event that the spotters also reported. Like them, she was ignored, even if she wasn’t degraded or threatened as the spotters were by some of their commanders.”
“The NCO’s warning was passed on to senior officers in her unit and to field intelligence. A senior intelligence officer responded to her by email; he praised her work but added: “It seems imaginary to me.”
“The NCO stood her ground. It’s not imaginary, she responded. It wasn’t for show but an example of what Hamas could do. According to her, Hamas’ level of detail and scenarios it practiced showed this.”
“An older NCO, her commander, sided with her. He wrote that he had 30 years of experience and concluded that the exercise was for real, not for show. She added: We’re marking 50 years since the Yom Kippur War. You can’t say it’s imaginary.”
“The NCO’s last warning arrived in August in a document distributed to a number of senior staffers in the unit and field intelligence. She felt that this was the right group to receive this information. She detailed the plan as she understood it and the exercises that Hamas had held.”
“Her conclusions closely conform to events less than 2 months later. She warned that starting then, the negative scenario could happen.”
“A third veteran NCO joined her in her warnings. Weeks before October 7, a senior officer visited the southern base where the intelligence had been collected and the warnings were drawn up.”
“He was shown the intelligence, but it seems the top officers at the unit and at Military Intelligence didn’t give the statements sufficient weight. The veteran but lower-level professional got the impression that the senior command wasn’t taking the warnings seriously.”
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Gronda Morin 
I have a totally different scenario for you.
Yahu wants a reason to invade Gaza and kick Paletinians off the ancestral homeland. He infiltrates HAMAS and whispers about a large attack on Isreal to seem to attempt the start of a war whereby the Palestinians can drive the Jews “into the sea!” Maybe he suggests how, manybe he just encourages them.
When he learns HAMAS is willing to try such an attack, rather than trying to prevent it, ge lets it happen. He wants to declare war on HAMAS, because it opens the door to invade Gaza. He tells Gazans to move south where they will be safe, but he knows they can only go so far before their density creates criticsl mass. Not enough food, not enough water, and many people dead and/or horribly wounded when missiles start to fall. He does not care if civiliabs live or die. As long as they disappear!
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Hi, again!
I’m NOT convinced that Israel’s prime minister’s far right conservative administration didn’t deliberately discount/ ignore ample, accurate, timely, detailed intelligence within their possession from allies and from within, and that’s why the US and other western leaders should be demanding an investigation now, instead of waiting, post war.
During 2023, Israeli protesters, dissenters within Israel’s government and Israel’s Supreme Court’s justices managed to block the prime minister with his far-right conservative governing partners from implementing judicial changes that would’ve transformed Israel from a democracy to an autocracy. These moves were extremely unpopular, causing this right-wing governing coalition to tank in popularity polls which meant that their tenuous hold onto power was at risk.
Let’s just state the obvious. This 2023 Israel-Hamas war came at an opportune time to allow these extreme right-wing governing members to hang onto power a bit longer while Israel is at war.
Hugs, Gronda
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A other reason to conduct a war — in their minds. To me it is mass murder on an unimaginable scale!
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Hi!
I’m thinking that the right-wing extremists in power who’ve been calling the shots are clueless to the harm that they are self-inflicting on Israel. They will no longer be a trusted entity by neighboring Arab countries’ leaders. Egypt is well aware that its intelligence arm provided ample, timely accurate data to Israel regarding the imminent planned attack by Hamas. These are not politically naive players and so, they know full well what Israel has been up to, while Israel is also turning off friendly allies.
But like all bullies, these Israeli right wingers in power are not about to go gently into that good night but this has to happen. Also, Hamas, the Iranian backed terrorist group in Gaza do have to be made to step down from power. They’ve been governing Gazans like a mafia or ISIS state since 2007.
This is why I know that Israel has a lot of explaining to do. Hamas’s own charter spells out in clear language that its goal is to eliminate all Jews living in Israel, and they’ve already fought 3 major wars with Israel. So, why on earth would Israel keep propping up Hamas with billions of dollars, unless Hamas is like the pig being deliberately fattened only to be taken to the slaughterhouse.?
This is a nightmare that happens for both Israelis and Palestinians when bullies are in charge, where cruelty is the point.
Hugs, Gronda
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Hugs and hi to you, Gronda. I hope someone is listening to your lists. You are taki g a brave stand. Peace be with you.
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