Once upon a time, Americans were witness to 9/11 (2001) events to where all of us recall where and how we learned about the New York City’s World Trade Center’s twin towers being bombed by two jet airplanes; and how flight 93 passengers heroically lost their lives by bravely attacking terrorists on board to save the Pentagon and many American innocent lives. Another plane did successfully crash into the Pentagon in Washington D.C. We lost almost 3000 lives in that one day with absolutely no warning. This was the single largest loss of life from a foreign attack on American soil. Understandably, this catastrophe seared disbelief, anger and fear into American hearts.
Later, we were informed that on 9/11/2001, nineteen al Qaeda terrorists led by the infamous Osama bin Laden, hijacked four U.S. jetliners, deliberately crashing two of the planes into the North and South Towers of the World Trade Center and a third plane into the Pentagon. The fourth plane was stopped from its goal by the passengers and crew members ganging together to overcome the terrorists holding them by gun point. Everyone on flight 93 lost their lives when the plane crashed into an empty field in Western Pennsylvania.
It is my contention that the U.S. used this 9/11 horror and the “WMD,” Iraqi’s ownership of weapons of mass destruction, as a pretext for the U.S. pentagon’s real intent to implement their 2001 plan to attack seven countries in the middle east. Iraq was one of the seven. Around 2003, I recall being upset with Vice President Dick Cheney and his neocon surrogates who frequently sold the American public on the war against Iraq, by associating Iraq with al-Qaeda and the al-Qaeda’s terrorist 9/11 attack on U.S. land. This was the typical bait and switch sales pitch. Iraq was Ba’athist, with a government which was secular. Iraqi’s leaders despised al-Qaeda and had absolutely nothing to do with 9/11. The neocons were well aware of these facts as they continued to cynically use the Americans’ painful memory and fear of the 9/11 tragedy by disseminating the falsehood of a connection between Iraq and al-Qaeda to gain the public’s approval, for the 2003 U.S. war on Iraq.
If it were not for our 2003 U.S. military’s incursion into Iraq, al-Qaeda and ISIS would not exist in Iraq today with its cancerous growth spreading into the neighboring countries, such as Syria. This was the catalyst for all the Syrian refugees that we are witnessing in 2015. We are in a very real sense in good measure, responsible for the existence of these refugees The U.S, government needs to fess up and pay up for what we owe them in the form of more monies and by taking in more refugees than 10.000. In my view ,we should take in at least 150,000. There are those who are inferring that Germany is taking in so many fleeing for their lives to make up for past sins. The U.S, who has paid trillions of dollars for our Iraqi experiment, should heed German’s example.
The following data and arguments form the foundation of my thinking that we owe the Syrian refugees, more than what we are currently doing.
Our U.S. President George W. Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair described the coalition mission to invade Iraq in 2003 as follows: “To disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction, to end Saddam Hussein’s support for terrorism, and to free the Iraqi people.” This reason while debatable today was the consensus by many in 2003. A CBS poll conducted in 2003 showed that over 60% of Americans approved of this war. According to Prime Minster Blair, the trigger was Iraq’s failure to take a “final opportunity” to disarm itself of alleged nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons that U.S. and British officials called an immediate and intolerable threat to world peace.”
To counter the above public statements, there is Max Frankel’s critique of General Wesley Clark’s book, ” Winning Modern Wars-Iraq, Terrorism, and the American Empire,” which can be found in the 10/13/2003 New York Times’ Book Review Section. Here are some excerpts indicating that there were other sub rosa motives behind the U.S. led war on Iraq.
“Clark admires the American performance in Iraq as he recounts with relish the ”synchronization of high-tech airpower with agile ground maneuvers” — how the rapid advance of armor forced Iraqi units to move and expose themselves to air and rocket attacks, which in turn facilitated more ground advances. But ”the irony is that the vision of . . . a high-tech battlefield, viewed through an array of sensors, with battles fought and won by precision strikes and a slimmer ground component — which the Bush administration, and especially Donald Rumsfeld, have trumpeted, is largely a reality that they inherited when they took office in 2001.”
“In any case, the war in Iraq, though generally well fought, was a costly diversion. ”Taking down Saddam became a hobbyhorse” for the group around Rumsfeld even before they achieved authority over the Pentagon. And they exploited 9/11 as ”a gift-wrapped opportunity” to try to ”clean up the Middle East.” So instead of concentrating on a ”knockout blow” against Al Qaeda (in Afghanistan), they turned the focus to Iraq.”
“As portrayed by Clark, the attack on Saddam Hussein — without evidence to link him to Al Qaeda — was not only wrong but deeply cynical. It bespoke a cold war mind-set of assigning terrorists a state sponsor, a ”face” that could be more easily attacked. ”It was almost certain to be successful. It emphasized U.S. military strengths and built on a decade of preparation for a refight of the gulf war.”
“The benefit of toppling Hussein is only faintly acknowledged: ”All else being equal the region and the Iraqi people were all better off with Saddam gone. But the U.S. actions against old adversaries like Saddam have costs and consequences that may still leave us far short of our objectives of winning the war on terror — or, in themselves, may actually detract from our larger efforts.” (Don’t be fooled by those conditional ”mays”; the general knows how to protect a rhetorical flank.)”
“The general’s predictions were soon enough overtaken by the sour news from Iraq. No one had planned properly for the occupation of Iraq and how to keep its army. And the United States Army proved ill suited for the tasks of empire. Hedging against better news in the future, the general observes, ”The occupation had thus far failed to meet popular Iraqi expectations in restoring security and minimal economic standards; Saddam Hussein had evaded capture for months; Baathist elements were hostile; Al Qaeda and other Islamic fighters (Sunnis) were entering the country; and a steady diet of daily sniping attacks, bombings and ambushes were producing more casualties each week among the Americans.”
General Wesley Clark, the former Supreme NATO Allied Commander and Joint Chiefs of Staff Director of Strategy and Policy, details in his 2003 book, Winning Modern Wars, his conversation with a military officer in the Pentagon after the 9/11/2001 attacks on U.S. soil regarding a plan to attack seven Middle Eastern countries in five years: “As I went back through the Pentagon in November 2001, one of the senior military staff officers had time for a chat. Yes, we were still on track for going against Iraq, he said. But there was more. This was being discussed as part of a five-year campaign plan, he said, and there were a total of seven countries, beginning with Iraq, then Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Iran, Somalia and Sudan.”
The following excerpts are from Wikipedia:
“The 2003 Invasion of Iraq lasted from March 19 to May 1, 2003 and signaled the start of the conflict that later came to be known as the Iraq War, which was dubbed Operation Iraqi Freedom by the United States (prior to March 19, the mission in Iraq was called Operation Enduring Freedom, a carryover from the conflict in Afghanistan). The invasion consisted of 21 days of major combat operations, in which a combined force of troops from the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and Poland invaded Iraq and deposed the Ba’athist government of Saddam Hussein. The invasion phase consisted primarily of a conventionally fought war which concluded with the capture of the Iraqi capital of Baghdad by American forces.”
In 2003, the insurgency that ensued after the initial combat operation turned, what was a tremendous success into a horrific failure. Today, the United States has less influence in Baghdad than Iran does. Iraq, a Shia-dominated state with an alienated Sunni minority (the previous dominant regional powerhouse), incurred rampant violence which broke out from the Sunnis led terrorist groups al-Qaeda and later, its offshoot, ISIS. At least 134,000 Iraqis died as a direct result of the American invasion, but the violence there continues.